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Abstract 
Given recent demands for more co-creational university technology commercialisation 
processes involving industry and end users, this paper adopts a micro level approach to explore 
the interaction between Quadruple Helix stakeholders within the university technology 
commercialisation process using a stakeholder lens. To explore this research question, a 
qualitative research methodology which relies upon comparative case analysis was adopted to 
explore the technology commercialisation process in two universities within a UK region. The 
findings revealed that university type impacts Quadruple Helix stakeholder salience and 
engagement and consequently university technology commercialisation activities and process. 
This is important as recent European regional policy fails to account for contextual influences 
when promoting Quadruple Helix stakeholder relationships in co-creational university 
technology commercialisation. 
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Introduction 
It is now widely acknowledged that university technology commercialisation is a key priority 
of universities in addition to that of teaching and research (Etzkowitz, 1998; Bastalich, 2010; 
Watermeyer, 2014). More recently, the increased recognition of universities as core actors in 
regional and national innovation systems (McAdam et al. 2012) and changing complexity of 
societal needs has resulted in the emergence of Quadruple Helix Stakeholder Relationships in 
the university technology commercialisation process (Carayannis and Campbell, 2009; 
Carayannis and Rakhmatullin 2014). Whilst various stakeholders such as venture capitalists, 
government agencies and industry have been involved in university technology 
commercialisation processes since the early 1990’s (Gibb 2010), these relationships have been 
ad hoc and transient. Indeed, recent European innovation policy now demands more co-
creational university technology commercialisation processes involving industry and end users 
(Arnkil et al. 2010; Mian 2011). Consequently, the emergent Quadruple Helix Model of 
Stakeholder Relationships reflects a shift from the normative Triple Helix (government, 
university and industry) to include end users as a core stakeholder in regional innovation 
ecosystems (Carayannis and Campbell, 2009 Leydesdorff 2011). Prior studies acknowledge 
that levels of innovation performance of the Triple Helix in terms GDP and jobs has been 
disappointing (Asheim and Coenen 2005; Lawler 2011). Indeed, under the guise of the Triple 
Helix, knowledge flows were said to be bi-directional which contrasts with the need for more 
co-creational engagement expected from regional innovation policy (Arnkil et al. 2010). 
 
Accordingly, Universities are being set performance targets and measurements based on an 
accountable Quadruple Helix stakeholder framework, with such a focus aligning with localised 
regional policies aimed at enhancing stakeholder collaboration in order to build an innovation 
ecosystem (MacGregor, Marques-Gou, and Simon-Villar 2010; Ivanova 2014). Indeed, 
inherent within university technology commercialisation studies discourse, is the assumption 
that the influence of Quadruple Helix stakeholders is primarily strategic (Leydesdorff 2011; 
Ranga and Etzkowitz 2013), with this influence diminished at micro levels where operational 
practices take precedence (Urbano and Guerrero 2013). However, university technology 
commercialisation models and processes at the ground level will be influenced by stakeholders 
who not only give strategic guidance linked to funding provision, but also require that 
performance measurement goals and targets are met to increase accountability and alignment 
between strategy and practice (Wilmott, 2003; McAdam et al. 2012; Mate-Sanchez-Val and 
Harris 2014).  
 
Extant research to date, albeit limited (Mate-Sanchez-Val and Harris 2014; Zahra, Wright, and 
Abdelgawad 2014) has focused on the influence of Quadruple Helix stakeholders at a macro 
regional context (MacGregor, Marques-Gou, and Simon-Villar 2010; Ivanova 2014) and 
acknowledges that regional and contextual variations are likely to cause variances in university 
technology commercialisation mechanisms, processes and outcomes within regions.  However, 
little is known about how Quadruple Helix stakeholder interactions directly impact micro level 
activities and processes in universities. Accordingly, this paper adopts a micro level approach 
to explore the interaction between Quadruple Helix stakeholders within the university 
technology commercialisation process using a stakeholder lens. The paper commences with an 
overview of stakeholder management processes (i.e. stakeholder identification and mapping, 
stakeholder salience and engagement) which are viewed as an instrumentalist approach to 
advance understanding of Quadruple Helix Stakeholder interactions within university 
technology commercialisation processes. The following section then presents the 
methodological rationale and method; which is followed by critical evaluation of the case study 
findings. Finally, the implications for theory and practice are considered. 
 
Our Theoretical Framing - Stakeholder Management Processes  
The development and use of stakeholder theory and concepts in university technology 
commercialisation has grown exponentially in recent years (McAdam et al. 2012; O’Kane et 
al. 2014). Building upon Miller, McAdam, and McAdam (2014), it is posited that three key 
stakeholder management constructs can facilitate our micro level exploration of the role of 
Quadruple Helix stakeholders in university technology commercialisation models and 
processes at micro levels, namely stakeholder mapping, salience and engagement. The first 
construct, stakeholder identification mapping (Preeble 2005; Neville, Bell, and Whitwell 2011) 
draws upon the normative validity of stakeholder management whereby stakeholders are 
identified by their interests in the organisation and the organisation’s interest in them 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995). Preeble (2005), consistent with Freeman (1984), argues that 
mapping stakeholders onto models and processes should identify the stakeholders and their 
relationships to the entity under consideration. Freeman’s (1984: 46) approach also highlights 
that a two-way relationship needs to exist between the firm and its stakeholders; with a 
stakeholder defined as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of a firm’s objectives’. This framework adopts a grouping approach to stakeholders with levels 
of homogeneity. Applied to the Quadruple Helix context, these groupings are government, 
university, industry and end user stakeholder groupings that may affect or be affected by 
university technology commercialisation activities at the ground level.  
 
The second stakeholder construct to consider is salience which helps organisations to optimise 
resource use within a position of bounded rationality (Labelle and Aka 2012). Mitchell, Agle, 
and Woods (1997) stakeholder salience model identifies that stakeholders can be classified and 
prioritised as having one or more attributes of power, legitimacy and/or urgency (Figure 1). 
Stakeholder Power is the extent to which a stakeholder can impose their willpower in a 
relationship. Legitimacy relates to social acceptance and expected structures or behaviours 
established over time. Urgency is the time sensitivity or criticality of a stakeholder’s claim. 
There is a need for prioritisation of Quadruple Helix stakeholders based on the salience 
construct which focuses on stakeholder attributes and the development of stakeholder 
management strategies (Frooman 1999; Neville, Bell, and Whitwell 2011) rather than 
assuming equanimity of all Quadruple Helix stakeholders and spreading resources too thinly 
(De Silva, 2015). 
 
The third stakeholder construct is that of stakeholder engagement where stakeholder(s) and a 
firm or entity interact in advancing or orchestrating a key organisational agenda (Labelle and 
Aka 2012). It is suggested, consistent with Greenwood (2007), that the process of Quadruple 
Helix stakeholder engagement is in effect an iterative alignment process where all aspects of 
university technology commercialisation processes must mutually adjust in a dynamic manner 
to accommodate Quadruple Helix stakeholder requirements. To orchestrate, or create and 
maintain these relationships, proactive stakeholder dialogue and engagement is necessary 
(Labelle and Aka, 2012). Morsing and Schultz (2006, 324) state ‘Stakeholder theory has 
developed a focus on the importance of engaging stakeholders in long-term value creation…the 
emphasis has moved from a focus on stakeholders being managed by companies to a focus on 
the interaction that companies have with their stakeholders’. Hence, in a university technology 
commercialisation context, engagement between Quadruple Helix Stakeholders and 
commercialisation processes is seen as a formative process of building relationships to enable 
mutual shaping and adjustment (Sharif, Liu and Ismail, 2014). 
 
Morsing and Schultz (2006) identify a threefold approach to stakeholder engagement where 
the type of engagement determines the resources required and the outcomes. The first approach 
is a one way dialogue with stakeholders, where either the stakeholder or the organizational 
entity transmits requirements with minimal need for interchange (Foster and Jonker 2005). This 
approach normally involves low salience stakeholders. The second approach is two-way 
stakeholder engagement which involves a meaningful exchange of information and knowledge 
sharing usually involving stakeholders with medium salience levels. The third approach to 
stakeholder engagement involves the stakeholder(s) with high levels of salience and the 
organizational entity going beyond two way exchange to that of joint design or co-creation. 
Overall, it is suggested that increasing levels of stakeholder salience demands higher levels of 
engagement and resource allocation (Foster and Jonker 2005; Morsing and Schultz 2006).  
 
Prior research identifies the complexity of developing more collaborative university 
technology commercialisation processes involving diverse stakeholder engagement (Miller et 
al., 2014; Sharif, Liu and Ismail, 2014; Rossi and Rosli, 2014). Indeed, Miller et al., (2014) 
identify that conflicting stakeholder demands can lead to disharmony and divergence in 
strategic decisions during commercialisation processes which can put a strain on scarce 
resources. Perkmann et al., (2013) argue that a wide range of individual, organisational and 
institutional factors may impact academic engagement with stakeholders during 
commercialisation processes. However, Ambros et al., (2008) found that tensions between 
conflicting stakeholder demands is more prominent at an individual as opposed to an 
organisational level where academics are faced with tensions between academic and 
commercial demands. Thus, a stakeholder lens is deemed apposite in order to understand the 
complexity of Quadruple Helix stakeholder’s engagement in university commercialisation 
processes and so improve alignment with regional innovation policy. 
 
 
 
Research Methodology 
Given our intention to aid understanding of the complex phenomena of quadruple stakeholder 
relationships in the university technology commercialisation process (Sharif, Liu and Ismail, 
2014), a qualitative research methodology was deemed appropriate. To orchestrate this, a case 
study approach was adopted. Accordingly, in-depth interviews were carried out with multiple 
stakeholders involved in university technology commercialisation processes of two universities 
within a peripheral region. These interviews were augmented with publically available 
documents such white papers and documentation available from the regional universities 
websites.  Table 1 provides the characteristics of the two universities showing their differing 
histories and approaches to university technology commercialisation. A heterogeneous 
purposeful sampling strategy was followed in order to select respondents who were information 
rich (Patton 2002) and consequently would be informative on the context under study. Table 2 
identifies the interviewees which took part in the study and their associated codes. University 
stakeholders comprised of the academic entrepreneurs (AE) involved in university technology 
commercialisation, technology transfer office staff (TTO) and head of schools (HOS). Insights 
to salience and engagement of industry and end users were gained through the enterprise co-
ordinators and TTO staff which was triangulated with document analysis of government 
strategies and white papers. Government stakeholders consisted of several operational and 
strategic government staff members from the local regional development agency involved in 
programmes aimed at university technology commercialisation. 
 
[Insert table 1 and 2 around here] 
 
Cross-case analysis was deemed appropriate as it facilitates the comparison of commonalities 
and difference in the events, activities, and processes (Yin 2014). A method of inductive coding 
(Miles and Huberman 1994) was then adopted which resulted in an initial process of open 
coding which was then synthesised into themes and subthemes through an iterative process of 
analysis and reflection through making use of ‘theoretical coding’ (Glaser 1992) parallel to the 
collection of data. This iterative process of data analysis built up a chain of evidence by means 
of data triangulation from the interviews and documents; thus helping alleviate some of the 
limitations of associated with case study research (Konecki 2008). 
 
Results and Discussion of Findings 
From the empirical findings, an evidence Table (Miles and Huberman 1994) was extracted and 
subsequently used to structure the discussion of the findings (Table 3). Within Table 3, the left 
hand column provides a brief description of the key micro level university technology 
commercialisation activities present at each university.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Stakeholders and Key University Technology Commercialisation Activities  
Our micro level exploration revealed that university technology commercialisation activity was 
influenced to varying degrees by Quadruple Helix based stakeholder salience and engagement; 
with salience and engagement dependent on commercialisation stage and the university type.  
 
Technology Disclosure  
It was evident throughout the interviews that the ability of AEs to engage in university 
technology commercialisation processes was dictated by their university remit. C2AE2 noted, 
‘As an academic you have teaching and research - technology transfer and commercialisation 
doesn’t always fit neatly with research’. Concurring with prior literature, there appeared to be 
tension between a AEs ability to engage in both high quality research and academic enterprise 
(Rothaermel, Agung and Jiang, 2007; Perkmann et al., 2013). A number of AEs in Case 1 
stated, they were judged by Research Excellence Framework (REF) outputs rather than 
commercialisation success measures (Watermeyer, 2014), thus ‘There is a real feeling that 
enterprise not a core initiative’ (C1AE1). The lack of perceived incentives or motivation 
internally within the university for academics to engage in university technology 
commercialisation was found to impact their willingness to disclose any commercially viable 
ideas, with some AEs in Case 1 preferring to release IP through internationally recognised 
publications, where it was deemed they would obtain greater reward and recognition internally. 
Hence, AEs in Case 1 were considered to have low salience, whereby they possessed the power 
to engage in commercialisation activities (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997) however, they 
lacked urgency and legitimacy due to their University’s remit (Table 3). This finding is 
consistent with Van Looy et al. (2011) and Hewitt-Dundas (2012) who stress that university 
type will impact engagement with university technology commercialisation activities. In 
contrast, in Case 2, C2AE3 highlighted that they had gained their academic promotion to senior 
lecturer and professorial levels by engaging in university technology commercialisation 
activities. In fact, academic enterprise was identified as a core and legitimate route for 
promotion within Case 2. This support meant that AEs in Case 2 appeared to have high salience, 
possessing the power, legitimacy and urgency to disclose their technology (Table 3) (Mitchell, 
Agle, and Wood 1997; McAdam et al. 2012). It was interesting to note the disparity of AE 
salience between the two universities at this stage considering the AEs important role in 
initiating the university technology commercialisation process and the fact that they ultimately 
possess the knowledge and skills which can be a source of revenue for the university and wider 
society (McAdam et al. 2010). Indeed, C1 AE2 identified ‘it’s a bit of a dilemma for academics 
because how they are measured is based on their research and when you are doing something 
entrepreneurial you have to do it in your own time’. Thus, alignment to salient Quadruple Helix 
stakeholders at this early stage was limited by ineffective reward and recognition systems in 
Case 1. Whilst academics in Case 2 received allowances in their work load allocation for 
enterprise and university technology commercialisation, this provision was only available to 
academics in Case 1 during later stages of the commercialisation process, typically requiring  
sabbatical leave. Consequently, during the disclosure stage, the HOS in Case 1 possessed high 
salience (Table 3), whereby they could exert their power, influence and urgency (Michell et al. 
1997; Frooman 1999) to discourage academics from disclosing a technology and instead 
encourage them to publish which is core to the research remit of the university (Van Looy et 
al. 2011; Hewitt-Dundas 2012). In contrast, in Case 2, the HOS was deemed to be a 
discretionary stakeholder with low salience (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997) at the disclosure 
stage since the AE had the power, urgency and legitimacy to engage in technology 
commercialisation (Table 3).  
 
The core remit of each university and promotional mechanisms (Van Looy et al. 2011; Hewitt-
Dundas 2012) also had an effect on the salience of the TTO staff at the initial disclosure stage. 
In Case 1, the TTO was found to have low salience since they did not possess the power or 
legitimacy to promote technology commercialisation as a core activity within the university 
(Table 3) (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; McAdam et al. 2012). However, they did possess 
urgency, in that they had performance targets set at the university level which had to be met to 
prevent funding being reduced (McAdam et al. 2012). In Case 2, the TTO was found to have 
high salience (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997) since internal promotional mechanisms gave 
them the power and legitimacy to encourage academics to engage in technology 
commercialisation (Table 3). In Case 1, it was interesting to note the devolved systematic 
approach to performance measurements from the Macro (regional), to the micro (ground) level. 
C1TTO2 stated that the performance criteria at the micro level was a ‘black box’ particularly 
in relation to REF; thus leading to ambiguity and misalignment at the micro level (Bastalich, 
2010; Watermeyer, 2014).  
 Recent policy demands to include end users and industry throughout the technology 
commercialisation processes was noted during the interviews. However, in Case 1, the 
university remit meant that there was a lack of motivation for AEs to engage with these 
stakeholders. This meant industry and end users had low salience at these initial stages where 
they were found to possess power as a result of recent innovation policy but lacked urgency 
and legitimacy to enforce this power as a result of university processes (McAdam et al. 2012; 
Miller, McAdam, and McAdam 2014). In Case 2, industry and end users did appear to possess 
legitimacy as a result of academic enterprise being a core route to promotion however, levels 
of engagement with industry and end users still needed to increase which TTOS1 identified 
would take time to instil the cultural change necessary (Rothaermel, Agung and Jiang, 2007; 
Miller, McAdam, and McAdam, 2014). 
 
At the technology disclosure stage, engagement between the different Quadruple Helix 
stakeholder groups in both cases appeared to be largely two way (Foster and Jonker 2005; 
Morsing and Schultz 2006). However, in Case 1, despite the two-way engagement, the high 
salience of the HOS often led them to exert their influence over a AEs engagement with 
university technology commercialisation (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; Frooman 1999), 
which consequently was found to impact upon their motivation to engage with industry and 
end users due to pressures to publish and apply for research funding. In contrast, AEs in Case 
2 were found to have more freedom to engage in university technology commercialisation and 
had more resources devoted to engagement with industry and end users as a result of their 
academic remit.  
 
 
 Technology Assessment, Appraisal and Patenting  
Following the disclosure of a technology, the next stage in the commercialisation process was 
assessment and appraisal by a commercialisation executive who was often discipline specific. 
This assessment would then lead to a decision as to whether to patent a technology or not 
progress it further. During these stages, the TTO in both universities was considered to have 
high salience (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997) since they ultimately made the decision as to 
whether a technology was further developed (McAdam et al. 2010). In this activity, the 
interviews showed that tension was evident between Quadruple Helix stakeholders, stressing 
the complexity of stakeholder engagement (Nenonen and Storkbacka 2010). In Case 1, some 
AEs expressed their dissatisfaction over how technologies were appraised. C1AE3 noted, ‘If 
you have a technology that does not fall directly in there it is very hard convincing them there 
is something’. In fact, a common sentiment amongst the AEs was that external experts should 
be sought and consulted for every disclosure to overcome internal subjectivity. Extant research 
(Rothaermel, Agung and Jiang, 2007; Urbano and Guerrero, 2013) recognises that TTOs often 
have a lack of resources spanning discipline areas, which can affect their initial assessments of 
technology disclosures. However, the TTOs in both cases identified that any deficits in 
knowledge was supplemented by external industry sources on a contractual basis. 
Consequently, industry and end users were considered a key stakeholder in contributing to 
technology assessment and appraisal (Arnkil et al. 2010). However, as mentioned, Case 2 had 
stronger engagement with industry and end users due to enterprise and industry liaison being 
high on their internal promotion agenda. As a result, TTO staff within Case 2 often had well 
developed personal industry networks which they consulted to gauge interest in disclosed 
technologies. As C2TTO1 noted ‘I can just phone XX (industry) up and get their opinion which 
is based on how things are progressing in the sector’. Consequently, industry and end users 
were considered to have high salience in Case 2 since they possessed the power and legitimacy 
to influence the outcome at this stage of the commercialisation process (Mitchell, Agle, and 
Wood 1997; Frooman 1999) (Table 3). Whilst Case 1 did have contacts with industry, these 
were less developed and often industry specific. In Case 1, industry possessed power and 
legitimacy but lacked urgency (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997) since technology 
commercialisation was not considered to be high on the agenda for certain social science 
disciplines. The AEs in both cases were considered to lack power during technology appraisal 
and assessment however, possessed legitimacy. Furthermore, in Case 1 the AE lacked urgency 
since academic enterprise was not high on the remit of this research intensive university; 
consequently, in Case 1 the AE had low salience whilst in Case two they had moderate salience.  
 
In both universities, Quadruple Helix stakeholder engagement appeared to continue to be two-
way between the AE and the TTO and the TTO and industry/end users (Preeble 2005; Morsing 
and Schultz 2006). However, it was stressed by government that more co-creational 
collaboration and engagement with industry was needed to enhance the chances of 
commercialisation success and to facilitate the shaping of technologies from an early stage to 
meet the needs of both the region and society (Arnkil et al. 2010; Leysdorff 2012) since ‘there’s 
no point developing technologies that no-one wants…or even what we want locally’ (GOV2). 
Government considered industry and end users to be high salience definite stakeholders from 
the initial disclosure stages and as a core source of knowledge facilitating technology appraisal 
and assessment however, there was a mismatch between the low and moderate salience 
industry /end users actually had in both the Case Universities and the expectations of 
government. 
 
 
 Seeking Funding and Further Concept Development  
Funding support for technology commercialisation appeared to come from a wide range of 
Quadruple Helix stakeholders, each with their own priorities (Holmes and Moir 2007; Nenonen 
and Storkbaca 2010). Both universities had internal ‘proof of concept’ funds administered 
through their respective TTOs to support very early stage technologies so they could be 
developed to a point where larger funding streams could then be applied for (McAdam et al. 
2010). At this stage, market research was also carried out by both the technology 
commercialisation staff and the AE. It was evident that in Case 1, AEs continued to lacked 
urgency and had low salience since technology commercialisation was not high on the 
University’s remit (Hewitt-Dundas 2012). However, the two TTOs had high salience during 
activity where they exerted their influence on the AE to seek out additional funding to ensure 
the university had a return on their investment (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; Frooman 
1999).  
 
Tension and hostility was apparent at this stage in both universities as AEs believed it was the 
responsibility of the TTO to progress the technology from the business side and for them to 
continue to develop the technology (Macho-Stadler, Perez-Castrillo, and Veugelers 2007; 
McAdam et al. 2005, 2010). Indeed, TTO micro level activities in both universities had 
performance targets set at a university level which were linked to wider regional (macro) goals, 
therefore the TTO in both universities were subject to pressure from the regional and university 
levels to progress technologies. However concurring with McAdam et al. (2010) and 
Mangematin, O’Reilly, and Cunningham (2014) the AE was identified as the driving force to 
progress the technology through the different stages of commercialisation. This finding was 
interesting since in case 1, the AE did not appear to have much power until external funding 
had been obtained. This disparity over the role of the AE and the lack of salience that he/she 
had in the early stages of the commercialisation process stressed the need for greater co-
creational engagement of the AE in early stage technology commercialisation activities 
(Morsing and Schultz 2006; Edvardsson, Tronvoll, and Thorsten 2011).  
 
The search for funding often involved the TTO and AE engaging with members of industry 
and end users including external consultants who developed market research reports on 
particular industries. This engagement was more established in Case 2, where industry had high 
salience (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). Industry and end user engagement and investment 
at this stage often led to their direct input in shaping the development of the technologies 
exerting their salience to achieve their own objectives (Frooman 1999; Holmes and Moir 2007). 
Thus, engagement at this stage was seen as often being co-creational in Case 2 (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004; Edvardsson, Tronvoll, and Thorsten 2011) (Table 3). Engaging with 
industry was found to help identify the demand for the product, key competitors and potential 
companies interested in investing in, or licensing, the technology (McAdam et al. 2005). In 
contrast, within Case 1, due to the lack of urgency of the AE to commercialise, industry and 
end users appeared to have moderate salience where they lacked legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle, 
and Wood 1997) and thus engagement appeared to be two-way (Edvardsson, Tronvoll, and 
Thorsten 2011). 
 
Concurring with prior research (Nenonen and Storkbacka 2010; Miller, McAdam, and 
McAdam 2014) the high salience of multiple stakeholders in the cases (Table 3) was seen to 
cause conflict at this stage. Indeed, C1CE1 identified, ‘you have multiple stakeholders, all of 
which want reporting metrics, a surprising number of them being mutually exclusive. It’s the 
nature of the beast’. However, there appeared to be a misalignment between the salience levels 
and engagement between certain stakeholders. For example, engagement between government 
and the AE appeared to be a one-way or at best a two-way dialogue leading to unresolved 
conflicting objectives in relation to timescales and outcomes ultimately leading to lack of 
direction and misuse of scarce resources (Holmes and Moir 2007; De Silva, 2015).  
 
Commercialisation Entity  
The last core commercialisation activity was the selection of the most appropriate 
commercialisation route. Potential routes typically included licencing agreements, joint 
ventures formed between the university and industry or spin-offs. It was identified that the 
commercialisation entity was largely dictated by the nature of the technology, with certain 
technologies lending themselves to the licencing agreement as opposed to the spin-out route. 
However, C1TTO2 identified that other influences dictated the process of commercialisation. 
‘You go with what funders want. At the moment (government agency) seem to want spin-out 
companies and they are providing a lot of money so spinout companies are very much an 
option’ (C1TTO2). Thus government appeared to have high salience if they were a funder of a 
technology.  In addition, in Case 1, it was identified that the university remit resulted in licences 
often being a more attractive option so that the AE could then return to focusing on their 
research. Thus, the HOS was seen to have high salience in Case 1. It was identified by both 
TTOs that a technology would only be developed into a spin-out company if it was the optimal 
solution since it was a very resource intensive and risk laden process. It was noted that the 
economic performance measures set at the regional level often dictated the commercialisation 
entity route adhered to. Thus, it was suggested that the funders of the technology had an 
influence over its progression to market (Frooman 1999; Miller, McAdam, and McAdam 
2014). 
 
There was tension amongst some of the AEs in both cases surrounding the actual rules and 
procedures that the TTO had for commercialisation reflecting the divergence of goals between 
the stakeholders and a lack of effective engagement (McAdam et al. 2010; Edvardsson, 
Tronvoll, and Thorsten 2011). In one instance, a particular AE from Case 2, wanted to spin-
out a company but technology commercialisation processes within that institution stated that a 
viable spin-out company required having potential customers identified in order to avoid the 
funding culture dependency. The AE perceived the technology commercialisation processes to 
be flawed since if there was sufficient number of potential customers they would not need 
funding support: ‘The point was to help us get to that stage and they wouldn’t let us spin it out 
so I am still a bit peeved about that. Actually I didn’t go back to the TTO for about three or 
four years after that’ (AE15). Thus the AE in both universities did not appear to have high 
salience to control the commercialisation route, they had legitimacy and urgency but ultimately 
lacked power. Both universities had spin-out entities which acted as a platform for technologies 
within their respective universities to spin-out. These entities were made up of members of 
industry and academia who then sat on the board of the newly formed spin-out company and 
consequently had industry and end users in both cases had high salience to shape its 
development. However, C2AE3 did not appear satisfied with this perceived bureaucratic 
structure in controlling complex technology development. ‘I will never have a company where 
they will own enough to control it. A non-technical person to run a highly technical company 
is not on’ (C2AE3). 
 
Furthermore, AE3 from Case 2 did not agree with the amount of equity a AE had to give to the 
university when commercialising a technology. The tensions over equity and IP valuation at 
micro levels were shared by Government. GOV2 identified ‘one of the issues we have identified 
is the evaluation of IP in the early stage and their unrealistic expectations compared to the 
expectations of industry’. GOV1 went on to identify that valuation of IP between government, 
industry and universities were inconsistent. It was noted ‘what would improve the 
commercialisation process within universities would be some independent process whereby IP 
is valued, independent of industry, independent of academia…’ (GOV1). This issue of a miss-
match between equity valuations was recognised by both universities as a deterrent to licencing 
technologies. The sources of conflict and disharmony between the various high salience 
Quadruple Helix stakeholders concurs with prior literature which identifies that each high 
salience stakeholder will try to exert their power to achieve their own objectives (Frooman 
1999; Nenonen and Storkbacka 2010; Miller, McAdam, and McAdam 2014). However, there 
did appear to be co-creational engagement in Case 1 in later stages of the commercialisation 
process. It was suggested by both the government staff and the strategic TTO staff members in 
Case 1 that a collaborative platform may aid relations between Quadruple Helix stakeholders 
in the future. Indeed, Holmes and Moir (2009) identify that when high salience stakeholders 
are collaborating, there is a need to improve communicative capacity to enhance the success of 
the engagement. 
 
Conclusions 
From the findings, it can be concluded that Quadruple Helix stakeholder salience plays a key 
role in influencing all stages of university technology commercialisation process. However, as 
shown in Table 3, the salience of each stakeholder varies at different stages and also varies 
according to university type, reflecting the complexity of commercialisation success. This is 
important with the growing interest as to how universities can develop more collaborative links 
with industry and end users.  The internal culture, academic remit and corresponding 
performance mechanisms of the two universities was found to dictate the power, legitimacy 
and urgency of Quadruple Helix stakeholder groups involved in technology commercialisation 
processes. Hence, it is evident that there is a need for a continual stage based assessment of 
stakeholder salience to reduce the chances of misaligned micro level activity and hence misuse 
of scarce resources (De Silva, 2015). It was identified that stakeholder engagement 
mechanisms were instrumental in aligning Quadruple Helix stakeholders across all of stages of 
technology commercialisation. Concurring with prior literature (Foster and Jonker 2005; 
Morsing and Schultz 2006), higher salience stakeholders did require higher levels of 
stakeholder engagement to ensure university technology commercialisation activity was 
aligned with stakeholder needs.  However, there appeared to be a mismatch between the 
salience attributed to certain stakeholders and the expectations of operating within an effective 
Quadruple Helix ecosystem. For example, as shown in Table 3, AEs in Case 1 had low levels 
of salience in the initial stages of technology commercialisation. Furthermore, the academic 
remit in Case 1 which placed emphasis on research funding and high quality publications meant 
that engagement levels with industry and end users were lower than in Case 2. In contrast, the 
academic remit in Case 2 which recognises academic enterprise as a core route to promotion 
led to industry and end users being attributed higher levels of salience and engagement during 
technology commercialisation. The core premise of an effective Quadruple Helix ecosystem is 
co-creational knowledge transfer and engagement between universities, government, industry 
and end users, however, this research identifies that this ideal is difficult to translate on the 
ground level where organisational idiosyncrasies, cultures and policies dictate the salience 
attributed to stakeholders and consequently their engagement.  
 
The contribution of this paper is an example of progressive coherence (Locke and Golden-
Biddle, 1997) in that it facilitates ‘next stepping’ (Gephart, 1986) in terms of moving the 
current debate forward through the micro level exploration of the use of stakeholder constructs 
to address calls for research to help Quadruple Helix relationships within a university context 
(Sharif, Liu and Ismail, 2014). In so doing, it demonstrates the need to consider contextual 
influences when exploring Quadruple Helix stakeholder relationships; where the university 
type may impact the salience attributed and engagement levels. This is important as recent 
European regional policy fails to account for contextual influences when promoting Quadruple 
Helix stakeholder relationships in co-creational university technology commercialisation. 
From a practitioner viewpoint, this paper provides insights into how practitioners involved in 
university technology commercialisation can maximise the effectiveness of Quadruple Helix 
relationships dependant on commercialisation stage and university type.  
 
Given the research question on which this paper rests, a case study approach was deemed 
appropriate. It is important to note at this juncture, that case study research does not lend itself 
to empirical generalizability (Yin 2014) however, through the adoption and application 
stakeholder constructs, analytical generalisation was achieved. Although, all regional contexts 
are unique, the analytical critique developed within this paper, could be further enhanced by 
future research encompassing cross sectional theory testing using large survey data in relation 
to stakeholder salience (power, legitimacy, urgency) and engagement type (one, way, two way 
and co-creational) in influencing successful collaborative university technology 
commercialisation.  
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 Figure 1 Stakeholder Salience Model (adapted from Mitchell et al.,1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the two regional universities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Profile of Respondents 
Table 3: Evidence Table 
 
 
 

 
